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INTRODUCTION: BOUNDARIES IN THEORY
AND HISTORY
By Regenia Gagnier
[The philosopher Dugald Stewart], wrote Carlyle, “does not enter
on the field to till it; he only encompasses it with fences, invites
cultivators, and drives away intruders; often . . . he is reduced to long
arguments with the passsers-by, to prove that it is a field, that this
so highly prized domain of his is, in truth, soil and substance, not
clouds and shadow.”1 (qtd. in Beer 2)
I. Theory of Boundaries
WHEN ANGELIQUE RICHARDSON AND I began collecting the essays included here, we were
interested to see how recent theorists of boundaries like Audre Lorde (hyphenated identities),
Gloria Anzaldua (borderlands), Donna Haraway (cyborg), J-F Lyotard (the in-between), or
Jacques Derrida (deconstruction) fared in relation to classic theorists of boundaries like
Aristotle, Hegel, Marx, and Darwin. We found that while the field of Victorian Studies
has absorbed the theory, current practitioners may refer little to past or present theoretical
masters. Rather they describe which boundaries were salient to the Victorians and why;
when they were permeable and how; and who enforced them and to what ends. The essays
in this volume focus on specific boundaries and amass a wealth of detailed knowledge
about them. They include the boundaries or boundlessness of London and her suburbs
(Parrinder, Cunningham); transnational or deterritorialized boundaries of empire (Spear
and Meduri); psychological boundaries (Rylance, Trotter); boundaries between body and
soul (Moran) and living and dead (Robson); generic boundaries (Barzilai, Howsam, Small,
Toker); boundaries of popular representation between art and politics (Ledger, Livesey); and
boundaries between humans, animals, and machines (Joseph and Sussman). The essays here
interrogate boundaries historically and pragmatically, with a high tolerance of the in-between
or queer, to which I shall return below.
Yet merely listing the kinds of boundaries that scholars seize upon when asked how
the Victorians divided or partitioned their world exposes the danger of such a collection
as this one. The boundaries are physical/geographical and conceptual, clear and blurred,
hard and permeable, conventional and defined by essential differences. While it seems both
unnecessary and unwise to attempt to summarize the individual essays focusing in detail
on specific boundaries, an introduction such as this can attempt to situate the study of
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Victorian boundaries in a larger contemporary discussion of boundaries, to ask how the
salient Victorian boundaries compare with salient twenty-first century boundaries, and to
interrogate the concept of boundary itself.
In 1991, I summarized the then state-of-the-art discourse on boundary construction
(Gagnier, 1991 55–98). Donna Haraway had signaled three boundary breakdowns causing
considerable stress in late twentieth-century life, in which the meaning of life – that is, of the
word life – was part of the stress. Those boundary breakdowns were between the human and
the animal, the human/animal and machine, and, more generally, the physical and the non-
physical. Biology and evolutionary theory had claimed that human and nonhuman animals
shared not only ancestry but also language, tool use, and social behavior, and animal rightists
repudiated the need for a separation between them. The distinction between organism and
machine had been challenged by Artificial Intelligence and the mechanical prolongation of
life by medicine. The distinction between physical and nonphysical had been further eroded
by modern microelectronics. This boundary breakdown, one of the material sources of what
was called the postmodern condition, had made scholars sensitive to cultural variation in
boundary construction.
Also in the 1990s, California published The Boundaries of Humanity (Sheehan and Sosna
1991) on humans, animals, and machines, just as transgenics were beginning to press on the
boundaries between species. Since 1991, biological techno-science has gained ascendency
over physics as the sexy science in providing figures for modern or postmodern life, with
concepts of recombinance2 (from DNA) and genomics or geno-semantics (from the genome)
influencing the way we think about crops, individuals, social life, and the global market
(Egenis, Gagnier 2003, Haraway). Fantasies of the customized meal (“Have it your way”),
the customized self (“Be all that you can be”), the GenRich Society (“designer babies”)
culminate in what is evidently the mother of all biological fantasies: the virtual sex or auto-
romance that is the grail at the end of virtual reality’s quest. The wealth fueling the web
began with war or defense funding and now grows with the sex industry. The dream is the
opposite of the Victorian flaneur’s, who walked the streets and watched the world around him.
Now, the environment is in the head of the artificial lover, immobile but no longer bounded
by location. Tourists need not travel, but the holiday comes to them. With virtual reality
we can experience the obliteration of geographical boundaries, an Ibiza of the mind. After
Darwin, species that were thought to be distinct in genus and difference became connected
and indistinct when we extended their profiles through space and time. Just as Darwinian
evolution was thought to disrupt boundaries irreparably between species and between the past
and present (Richardson), so current technology is thought to disrupt natural boundaries. Such
that some postmodernists think that nature’s boundaries are obsolescent.
The collapse of boundaries between humans, animals, and machines that Haraway has
claimed to characterize postmodern life is premised on the broadly modern concept of natural
kinds. Traditional natural kinds were bounded by essential differences. It is the loss of such
essential differences that for Haraway signals the boundary breakdowns of postmodernity, and
indeed rarely can one find boundaries discussed without discussion of kinds. In the genealogy
of classification that precedes Plato and continues through Locke’s Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (1689, e.g., II.i.6), Ian Hacking locates William Whewell’s The Philosophy
of the Inductive Sciences (1840, esp. Book VIII, ch. i, sec. 4) and John Stuart Mill’s A
System of Logic (1843, esp. Book I, vii, sec. 4) as fixed points that distinguished natural
from conventional kinds (Hacking). Whewell made “kind” into a technical term of English
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philosophy. Mill put it that differences were made by nature while the recognition of those
differences as grounds of classification and of naming was the work of “man.” Hacking’s work
shows that the history is not merely academic or philosophical but also institutional: Whewell,
who gave us the technical stand-alone usage of the word kind, also invented the word scientist,
the species that increasingly came to claim authority to determine what kinds were natural.
While Hacking inclines toward the view that the work of natural kinds that absorbed British
philosophy from the 1840s is coming to an end, other philosophers of science (esp. Dupre´
1993, 2002) find that many natural distinctions remain useful, often and perhaps especially
when they are “folk” or “commonsensical,” and Dupre´ typically uses commonsense natural
boundaries and kinds to deflate the pretensions of science to a monopoly on truth or to
celebrate the plurality of ways there are to describe or divide the world.
In “Is ‘Natural Kind’ a Natural Kind Term?” Dupre´ opts for a nontraditional, i.e., non-
essentialist, retention of the term natural kind that is primarily methodological: a
Factors of many kinds may be needed to explain the path that a scientific research programme follows
through erotetic [question-driven] space. . . . Relative to a sufficiently well-articulated set of aims of
enquiry there may very well be, and often is, a best way of classifying the phenomena within a domain.
Relative to such a specific enquiry, it seems sensible to say that such a best classification distinguishes
natural kinds. The pluralism . . . implies that there will usually be no unique set of natural kinds, and
different natural classifications may often overlap and cross-cut one another. The natural kinds of
ecology, say, may not coincide with the natural kinds of phylogeny. But natural kinds in this sense
will necessarily fail to meet traditional desiderata. They will not point towards the essence of a thing,
and they will only tell how a thing should be classified for a certain purpose, not how it should be
classified, period. . . .
The classifications I have discussed . . . are grounded in factors as diverse as physical structure,
historical origin, role in a system of interdependent entities, and so on. These share nothing but the
bare methodological essence of playing the important roles they do in the theories that they inform.
(Dupre´ 2002 105, 122–23)
Whatever professional philosophy finally decides about the status of natural or essential
boundaries, genealogists of taxonomy have shown that the nineteenth century was exercised
about boundaries that seemed self-evidently natural but were nonetheless threatened as if they
were merely conventional: gender, racial, ethnic or religious, class, and species boundaries.
“Language is our Rubicon,” the German philologist F. Max Muller optimistically announced,
“which no brute will dare to cross” (Navarette 185), making speech the differentia specifica
of humans. Today the concept of boundary like that of natural kind or essence ceases to be
a Rubicon that divides definitively. We are often less interested in what the boundary is than
in what being on or near the boundary entails (Levy 2002).3 The political theorist William
Connolly has written of “the ambiguity of boundaries” in contemporary politics.
In a world experienced by many to be without a natural design to which they might conform, the
function of boundaries becomes highly ambiguous. Boundaries form indispensable protections against
violation and violence; but the divisions they sustain also carry cruelty and violence. Boundaries
provide pre-conditions of identity, individual agency, and collective action; but they also close off
possibilities of being that might otherwise flourish. Boundaries both foster and inhibit freedom; they
both protect and violate life.
400 VICTORIAN LITERATURE AND CULTURE
The political question is how to come to terms with the ambiguity of boundaries, how to fight
against their sacrifices and violences without sacrificing their advantages altogether. (1995 163)
Connolly discusses the power it takes to impose boundaries, the formation of rough peoples
into polises through their establishment, and the complexities that enmesh a state when
mobile media like money, goods, labor, capital, and entrepreneurial activity flow across its
boundaries.
Moving from geographical boundaries of the state to the boundaries of identity, Connolly
considers a pluralized culture’s most sensitive political crux as “the tendency by established
identities to fundamentalize what they are by demonizing or rendering needy what they
are not” (1985 194), highlighting the ambiguity of boundaries, that they bond and make
intelligible but they also divide and enforce enmity. He concludes that “Boundaries abound.
So do the ambiguities traversing them. . . . Once you acknowledge the difficulty of defining
in advance precisely when, where, and how democratic exclusions must be enforced, the
foremost challenge today becomes to multiply boundaries in imperfect correspondence with
one another – so that lines of division across one dimension do not correspond too closely
with those across others” (1995 198). In Connolly’s most recent work (2003), he has used
the figure of “porous membrane” to conceptualize boundaries, which suggests not a firm
obstacle but something that allows us to situate ourselves in relation to it, on either side, or
even passing to and fro through it.
From Plato’s Forms and Aristotle’s Categories, to Locke’s distinctions between real and
nominal essences, to Whewell’s and Mill’s natural kinds, and finally to Connolly’s, Dupre´’s,
and Hacking’s work on the permeability, construction, and usefulness of boundaries, we can
move from the absoluteness of boundaries that divide natural kinds demarcated by essences
to the function of the boundary, or what it means to inhabit the bounded space. In the
boundary between the disabled and the able-bodied, we can only be disabled in relation to
a certain function. The lame are disabled in vertical buildings only until we have access to
elevators. We are all disabled from flying like birds until we gain access to the skies through
flying machines. We are mentally disabled without access to information technology. The
boundaries between the able and disabled may be more about access than kind or essence (see
Dupre´ 1998 and Joseph and Sussman below). The same could also be said of the boundaries
between genders, races, classes, and religions. They may be more about access than essence.
II. Victorian Social Boundaries from Taxonomy to Statistics
HAVING BRIEFLY CONSIDERED where we are in contemporary thought about boundaries,
we might return to the Victorians. The Victorians were obsessed with mapping, charting,
categorizing, and Beatrice Webb attributed it to anxieties about access. “Detailed descriptions
of the life and labour of the people in all its various aspects,” wrote Webb of the 1880s,
sensational or scientific, derived from personal observation or statistical calculation, become a
characteristic feature of the publications of the [1880s], whether newspapers or magazines, plays
or novels, the reports of philanthropic organisations or the proceedings of learned societies. It may
be said that this novel concentration of attention on the social condition of the people was due neither
to intellectual curiosity nor to the spirit of philanthropy, but rather to a panic fear of the newly
enfranchised democracy. (Webb 150)
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Charles Frederick Gurney Masterman’s From the Abyss: Of the Inhabitants by One of Them
(1902) posited that urban population growth had caused the panic. The wide perception of
an unintelligible “abyss” had caused the liberal Victorians to analyze, categorize, and map
as a way to buttress the individual and space around him: “This, then, is the first thing to
note of us, not our virtue or vices, beauty, apathy, or knowledge; but our overwhelming,
inconceivable number” (Keating 66). In 1851, the population of England and Wales was
nearly 18 million; by 1901, 32.5 million (Scotland: 2.8 million in 1851 and 4.4 million in
1901) (Mitchell 8).4 London grew from a population of 2,685,000 in 1851 to 6,586,000
in 1901, with Britain’s next largest city, Manchester, at 303,000 and 645,000, respectively
(Mitchell 75). If one compares London’s 6.5 million at the fin de sie`cle to Leningrad’s
1.2 million or Paris’s 2.7 million (Mitchell 75), one gets some sense of the magnitude that led
to perceptions of boundlessness described in the urban (geography), urbane (psychology),
and suburban (lifestyle) essays by Parrinder, Trotter, and Cunningham below.
Statistics was the technology for coping with these numbers, and its development in
the course of the nineteenth century reformed conceptual boundaries. Taxonomies tried to
fit people into kinds. Taxonomic statistics quantified taxonomic information, as in Henry
Mayhew’s calculations of people in different trades. Purer statistics developed with arbitrary
categories, such as income or age distributions. From the 1830s, the establishment of statistical
societies and city police departments accompanied discourse on transgression of boundaries
through crime, prostitution, infectious disease, and degeneracy. Mayhew’s studies of the
trades in the Morning Chronicle from 1849–50 and their sequel London Labour and the
London Poor (1861–62) on metropolitan streetfolk providing goods and services to the very
poor followed three decades of investigation of population growth: statistical societies, Royal
Commissions, Select Committees on the administration of Poor Laws and the Health of
Towns. Scientific taxonomies of the working population had been constructed as early as the
1830s by Charles Babbage and Andrew Ure, then by Prince Albert for the Great Exhibition,
and finally the Census. Friedrich Engels divided workers between skilled (unionized) and
unskilled. John Stuart Mill had divided labor between 1) producers of material objects,
2) educators, who conferred on human beings qualitites that rendered them serviceable
to themselves and others and 3) servitors, or those who gave pleasure or averted pain
without leaving a permanent acquisition. Mayhew added “auxiliaries,” or those who assisted
the producers, and settled on boundaries between Enrichers, Auxiliaries, Benefactors, and
Servitors.
Mayhew’s childhood aspiration was to be a research chemist, the taxonomer par
excellence dividing the world into its composite elements, which aspiration resulted in a
lifelong pursuit of scientific induction. But as his ethnographic studies increased, he came
to see that the boundary between needlewoman and prostitute was but a porous membrane
frequently traversed when wages dropped below subsistence. Just as there was no essential
boundary that kept the cholera out of the rich employer’s home, there was no essential
boundary between the women, for they could be one and the same; the boundary was
only between her roles or status. Only the weather divided a worker’s status among the
Unemployed, Dependent, or Residuum (Charles Booth’s Class B [see below], casual earners
or the very poor). A frozen river could put builders out of work and force their wives to
glut the market, causing large-scale movement downwards: a piano-maker could be demoted
to cabinet-making, to street-selling, and finally to the docks, warehouse, and whorehouse,
where it was crowded at the bottom.
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The Enlightenment practices of classification analyzed in Michel Foucault’s Order of
Things did not culminate in Mayhew’s case in a predictable power-knowledge but in the
final obliteration of class boundaries: distinctions multiplied until all that remained were not
the abstract categories of the political economists or charity organizations but the unique
“character” singularly embedded in its world, i.e., a narrative something like literature. The
first volume of London Labour and the London Poor, “Of the London Streetfolk,” offered “six
distinct genera or kinds” of streetsellers, streetbuyers, streetfinders, streetperformers, street
artizans and street laborers. In volume 2, Mayhew provided a chart showing their environment,
“Showing the Quantity of Refuse Bought, Collected, or Found, in the Streets of London”
representing the monumental circulation and recycling of everything from horsedung and
cattle-droppings to copper to women’s stays to fishskins in tabular form. Was he a taxonomist
gone mad, like Foucault’s description of the aphasiac: “and so the sick mind continues
to infinity, creating groups then dispersing them again . . . teetering finally on the brink of
anxiety” (xviii)? Or was Mayhew the deepest of historians carefully placing the makers and
their manufacture in the densest of worlds?
By the end of the century Mayhew’s successor Charles Booth produced the Poverty Maps
(1889–99), hand-colored to show seven classes in the metropolis, street by street: the lowest
class, vicious, semi-criminal; the very poor, casual employment; the poor; the mixed, some
comfortable, others poor; the fairly comfortable, good ordinary wages; the middle-class,
well-to-do; and upper-middle and upper classes, wealthy. Booth’s investigators – including
the young Beatrice Potter (later Webb) – accompanied School Board Visitors and policemen
on their beats, visiting what they perceived as naturally bounded workplaces, homes, and
places of worship. Booth equated qualitative evidence with sensationalism and insisted that
he “would make use of no fact to which I cannot give a quantitative value” (Booth 1: 6). The
survey data were used to generate statistical evidence. After Booth’s survey the poor came
to be represented as statistical tables, poverty cycles, and subsistence levels. The sociologist
ceased to be a slumming social explorer navigating an abyss and became the disinterested
interpreter of abstract data.
Karl Marx did not categorize people, even workers and capitalists, with boundaries
between them so much as show the social processes that threw them on one side or the other
of the boundary. Labor could be creative or alienated; labor power could be a capacity or a
commodity. The producer who could not sell a product of his labor must sell his power to
labor. An object could be a use-value or exchange value depending on what you did with it.
Money could be cash or capital. Capitalism transformed natural capacities and essence into
something else and broke down boundaries hitherto firm: “All that is solid melts into air”
(Marx and Engels 476), or “Do not I, who thanks to money am capable of all that the human
heart longs for, possess all human capacities? Does not my money therefore transform all
my incapacities into their contrary?” (Marx and Engels 103–4). With Marx we are in the
modern or postmodern arena where the boundary ceases to be a natural Rubicon that divides
definitively and becomes a product of history.
III. The Boyhood of Raleigh
IN JOHN EVERETT MILLAIS’S THE BOYHOOD OF RALEIGH (1870), the salient boundaries are
between the exotic man-sailor and the aristocratic English boys; between the parrot (nature)
on one side and the toy ship (culture) on the other; between the land and the sea, and
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Figure 5. Sir John Everett Millais, The Boyhood of Raleigh. Oil on canvas, 1870. Courtesy of the Tate
Gallery. c© Tate, London 2004.
the sea and the skies beyond; and between the representation and the real as emphasized
by the broken frame (Figure 5). The boundary that is most likely to represent a real or
“natural” one, that between land and sea in the form of a coastline, illustrates our point.
A coast is a real or natural boundary in that it is made by nature and you can fall off it
and drown. It is indeterminate and conventional in that its length depends on how it is
measured. The Cornish coastline is 258 miles to circumambulate; measured in fractals it is
indefinitely long, for each little bay or inlet has gorges and rivulets that augment the length ad
infinitum.
What might have been in the minds of the Victorians who viewed The Boyhood of Raleigh
from 1870? Perhaps the sailor’s pointing finger indicated that emigration from the UK and
Ireland increased from 1.3 million to 3.1 million between 1850 and 1901 (Mitchell 129)?
That imports rose during that period from £103m to £485m and exports from £71m to £255m
(Mitchell 575)? That in 1850 Britain’s main trading partners were Germany, India, and the
United States; but whereas in 1850 the USA received £15m of export and in 1900 £20m, by
1900 Britain imported from the US £139m (Mitchell 661–63)?
Wolfgang Schivelbusch has argued that with the railway and its passengers came a world-
historical world-view, the panorama. In 1850, there were 9,797 kilometres of open railway
line in Great Britain with 67.4 million passengers (Mitchell 674); in 1900, 30,079 kilometres
with 1 billion, 114 million passengers (Mitchell 702). Yet the power of steam in the cultural
imaginary was also linked to seafaring and empire, hence the boys’ own sea-yarns, and
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the spectacular horrors of the Lusitania and the Titanic. The romantic Sir Walter Raleigh
(1552–1618) was the naval Queen Elizabeth I’s courtier, navigator, and poet, who suppressed
Ireland and despoiled Trinidad and Orinoco, lands “beyond” of some interest to Queen
Victoria’s subjects. In 1850, the UK registered 24,797 merchant sail ships with a net capacity
of 3,397,000 tons and 1,187 steamships, and by 1899, sail had diminished to 11,566 and
steam increased to 8,838 (Mitchell 714, 720). Viewers might have been vaguely conscious
that transport had become the second largest employer of men after manufacturing, with a
labor force in transport in 1851 of 433,000 males and 13,000 females and in 1901 1,409,000
males and 27,000 females (Mitchell 160).
Looking at the boys and the sailor, viewers may also have been vaguely conscious
that in 1850 there were 250,000 children and teachers in schools and by 1900 4,754,000
(Mitchell 872, 879). Millais himself, born in the port of Southampton was at eleven the
youngest student ever at the Royal Academy, and exhibited his first painting, Pizarro Seizing
the Inca of Peru, at seventeen. Millais’s own life, like Raleigh’s and the conquistadors
he painted, shattered many boundaries: artistic (with the revolutionary Pre-Raphaelite
Brotherhood), social (with his marriage to John Ruskin’s ex-wife Euphemia), and economic
(with the popularity of his late painting Bubbles [1886], which came to advertise soap
throughout the empire). Bubbles, with its commercialism, by Millais, President of the
Royal Academy, also shattered the boundaries of taste and access. Art with its aura had
entered the age of mechanical reproduction, and would never be bound to the museum
again.
Boundaries seem inevitably to point beyond themselves, as in the image of masses
flowing over London Bridge, or the growth of the suburbs, or the sublimity of the national
debt in trade. The sailor’s straight finger pointing Beyond has stayed in the memory of a
restaurateur in Edinburgh. On a brilliant white card advertising The Apartment Restaurant
only the pointing sailor is extracted, nothing left of the boys, or boat, or land and sea, only the
sailor pointing with the caption “A sudden Manhattan of the mind.” For imaginative culture,
one of the most profound meanings of boundary is that it points beyond itself. In Edinburgh,
“a sudden Manhattan of the mind.”
Postscript: Queerness, or Toward a Phenomenology of Fuzzy Boundaries
THE FIRST THING that we tend to notice about people is whether they are male or female,
hence the feeling of “queerness” that goes back at least to late Victorian literature when we are
confronted by persons whose gender is obscure. That is, historically, queerness is an affective
reaction of one person to another rather than an essence of the person reacted to. In the early
1980s some of my students in the San Francisco Bay Area insisted that they preferred the
term queer to Gay or Lesbian precisely because they enjoyed the liminality of not identifying
their gender or sexuality. This is the way the term was used in late Victorian literature: one’s
unidentifiability makes others feel “queer.” The 1890s, like the 1990s, took pleasure in the in-
between and the ambiguous, that which did not map onto identifiable categories, even when
they called it degeneration, devolution, or abjection (Hurley 1996). Instances of morphing
characters in Arthur Machen’s The Great God Pan (1890) or “protoplasmic reversion” in The
Three Imposters (1895) evoked “queerness,” which described how one felt when the sight
before one could not be identified within one’s conceptual frame. The instances of queerness
in late Victorian Gothic were explained thereafter by Freud in terms of the Uncanny or
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unheimlich, which Freud also located as a dis-ease in the subject rather than the object: what
is familiar and old – established in the mind – and has become alienated from it through the
power of repression (Navarette 198).
Yet when I observed this common thought-experiment, that the first thing we notice
about a person is gender, I was contradicted by an economist who told me that the first thing
she noted about another was whether she could kill it, or it kill her – a throwback, I thought,
to a Hobbesian war of all against all. We divide people into groups for diverse purposes and
functions.
A toleration or awareness of the pluralism of reality, or our constructedness of systems
of categorization and boundary, is characteristic of the discipline of literary and cultural
criticism. In a thought-provoking collection on disciplines at the Victorian fin de sie`cle,
Amanda Anderson and Joseph Valente (2002) have shown that the boundaries between
the disciplines were always porous membranes through which specialized knowledge,
institutional practice, and social status passed. Rather than police firm boundaries, we should
claim this tolerance, flexibility, and critique as the cherished state of the arts.
University of Exeter
NOTES
1. I am grateful to David Amigoni for drawing my attention to Carlyle’s description in connection with
the concept of boundaries.
2. Recombinance is a figure taken from genetics emphasizing rearrangement of parts rather than
mutational change. Biotechnologists design new forms by recombining DNA.
3. Levy has posed the question thus, using theory of organizational behavior.
4. All statistics in this Introduction are from Mitchell.
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